It is strange that the many American re viewers of The Letters of Robert Louis Steven con (Scribners) have paid so little attention to that part of the correspondence which recounts the author's experiences in California Stevenson visited more than once the Pacific coast of the United States, but we refer to the period from July, 1879, to July, 1880, when being 29 years of age, he tried to make a liv ing there. How hard he tried and how com pletely he failed are certainly striking incidents in an interesting career. How did it happen that a man of Stevenson's literary abilities not only failed to make a comfortable livelihood by writing for newspapers, but almost starved to death? We do not assert

that a satisfactory answer to this inquiry is given in his correspondence belonging to the period, but unquestionably we must look

for an enswer there if anywhere. Before glanding at the letters pertaining to this ep och in Stevenson's life we should note that it was not in California, but in France, that the prospective novelist had met the rican lady, Mrs. Osbourne, who was afterward to become his wife. Almost from their first meeting, which occurred soon after the cance voyage of 1876, Stevenson had conceived for her a devotion which never swerved nor faltered. Her domestic circumstances had not been fortunate, and on her return to America with her children in the autumn of 1878 she determined to seek a divorce from her susband. Hearing of her intention, together with very disquieting news of her health. on suddenly started for California at the beginning of August, 1879. He asked for no pecuniary supplies from home, but risking his whole future on the issue resolved to test during this adventure his power of supporting himself and eventually others by his own labors in literature. In order, from the outset, to save as much as possible he made the journey in the steerage and the emigrant train. With this prime motive of economy was combined a second, that, namely of learning for himself the pinch of life as it to falt by the unprivileged and the poor; and there was, also, a third motive, to wit that of turning his experiences to literary account. On board ship he took daily notes with this intent and wrote, moreover, "The Story of a Lie," for an English magazine. rived at his destination he found his health badly shaken by the hardships of the journey tried his favorite open-air cure for three weeks at an Angora goat ranch, some twenty miles from Monterey, and then lived from September to December in the old California coast town just named under the conditions set forth in his letters and under a combined strain of personal anxiety and literary effort. From the notes taken on board ship and in

the emigrant train, he drafted an account of his journey, intending to make a volume matching in form, though in contents very unlike. the earlier "Inland Voyage" and "Travels With a Donkey." Here he wrote, moreover, the essays on Thoreau and the Japanese reformer Yoshida Torajiro, afterward published in "Familiar Studies of Men and Books. one of the most vivid of his shorter tales, "The Pavilion on the Links," as well as a great part of another and longer story drawn from his new experiences and called "A Vendetta in the West." The last-named venture, however did not satisfy him, and was never finished He planned at the same time the tale in the spirit of romantic comedy which took final shape four years later as "Prince Otto." Toward end of December, 1879, Stevenson moved to San Francisco, where he lived for three months in a workman's lodging leading a life of frugality amounting to selfimposed penury, and working always with the same intensity of application until his health utterly broke down. One of the causes which contributed to his illness was the fatigue he underwent in helping to watch beside the sickhed of a child the son of his landlady During March and part of April, 1880, he lay death's door-his first really dangerous Mckness since childhood and was slowly tended back to life by the joint ministradons of his future wife and the physician to whom he addressed a letter of thanks which is printed in this collection of his corresponddage ensued in 1880; immed ately afterward, to consolidate his recovery he removed to a deserted mining camp in the California Coast Range; the aspects and humor of his life there are recorded in "The Silverado Squatters." The news of his dangerous illness and approaching marriage had, in the meantime, unlocked the parental heart and purse; supplies were sent from Edinburgh insuring his present comfort, with the promise of their continuance for the future, and of a cordial welcome for the new daughter-in-law In his father's house.

The first letter sent from California is adcressed to Sydney Colvin, and was penned at *Coast Line Mountains, California," in September, 1879: "Here is another curious start in life. T am living at an Angora goat ranch in the Coast Line Mountains, eighteen miles from Monterey. I was camping out, but got so sick that the two rancheros took me in and tended me. One is an old bear hunter, 72 years old, and a Captain from the Mexican War. The other, a pilgrim, and one who was out with the bear flag, and under Fremont when California was taken by the States. They are both true frontiersmen and most kind and pleasant. Capt. Smith, the bear hunter, is my physician, and I obey him like an oracle. To the same correspondent, he writes on Oct. 31. in the same year: "I am now all alone in Monterey, a real inhabitant, with a box of my own at the P. O. I have splendid rooms at the doctor's, where I get coffee in the morning (the doctor is French), and I mess with nother jolly old Frenchman, the stranded Afty-eight-year-old wreck of a good-hearted dissipated, and once wealthy Nantes trades man. My health goes on better; as for work the draft of my book was laid aside at page es or so, and I have now, by way of change, more than seventy pages of a novel one-volume novel alas! to be called either "A Chapter in the Experience of Arizona Breckonridge," or "A Vendetta in the West, or a combination of the two. The scene, from chapter 4 to the end, lies in Monterey and the adjacent country; of course, with my usual luck, the plot of the story is somewhat scandalous, containing an illegitimate father for piece of resistance."

In the same month and year, Stevenson writes from the same town to W. E. Henley: This is a lovely place which I am growing to love. The Pacific licks all other oceans out of hand; there is no place but the Pacific coast hear eternal roaring surf. When I get to the top of the woods behind Monterey, I can hear the seas breaking all round over ten or twelve miles of coast from near Carmel on my left out to Point Pinas in front and away to the right along the sands of Monterey to Castroville and the mouth of the Salinas. I was wishing yesterday that the world could get no, what I mean was that you should be kept in suspense like Mohammed's coffin until the world had made half a revolution. Then dropped here at the station as though you had stepped from the cars. You would then comfortably enter Walter's wagon that shall deposit you at Banchez's saloon, where we take a drink: you are introduced to Bronson, the local editor ('I have no brain music,' he says, 'I am a mechanic, you see.' but he's a nice fellow ; to Adolpho Sanchez, who is delightful. Meanwhile I go to the P. O. for my mail; thence we walk up Alvarado street together, you now loundering in the sand, now merrily stumping on the wooden sidewalk: I call at Hadsell's for my paper; at length, behold us installed in Simoneau's little whitewashed back room around a dirty table cloth, with Francois, waiter, perhaps an Italian fisherman and Simoneau himself. Simoneau, Francois and I are the three sure cards; the others mere walfs Then home to my great airy rooms, with five windows opening on a balcony; I sleep on the foor in my camp blanket; you install yourself in bed: in the morning, coffee with the doctor

a day of it; and, by night, I should let you up again into the air, to be returned to Mrs. Heney in the forenoon following. By God, you would enjoy yourself. So should I. I have tales enough to keep you going till 5 in the morn ing, and then they would not be at an end. A little later, on Nov. 15, 1879, Stevenson writes Edmund Gosse: "I will send you herewit a Monterey paper where the works of R. L. S. appear; not only that, but all my life, on studyng the advertisements, will become clear. lodge with Dr. Heintz; take my meals with Sinoneau; have been only two days shaved by the tonsorial artist Michaels: drink daily at the Bohemia saloon; get my daily paper from Hadsell's; was stood a drink to-day by Albano Rodriguez; in short, there is scarce a person advertised in that paper but I know him, and I may add, scarce a person in Monterey but is there advertised. The paper is the marrow

Even the narrowest kind of a livelihood seems a have been unattainable by Stevenson it Monterey, and in the course of December he moved to San Francisco, apparently in the hope of earning money by writing for the newspapers

in that city. His hope was not fulfilled. On Dec. 26, 1879, he writes from San Francisco to Sidney Colvin: "I am now writing to you in a cafe waiting for some music to begin. For four days I have spoken to no one but to my landlady or to my landlord, or to restaurant waiters. This is not a gay way to pass Christ mas, is it? And I must own the guts are a little knocked out of me. If I could work I could worry through better. But I have no style at command for the moment; with the second part of the 'Emigrant,' the last of the novel, the essay on Thoreau and God knows all waiting for me. But I trust something can be done with the first part [of the "Emigrant"] or, by God! I'll starve here." A fortnight later things were no better, for, on Jan. 10, he tells the same correspondent: "Any time between 8 and halfpast 9 in the morning, a slender gentleman in an ulster with a volume buttoned into the breas of it may be observed leaving No. 608 Bush street, San Francisco, and descending Powell street with an active step. The gentleman i R. L. S.: the volume relates to Benjamin Franklin, on whom he meditates one of his charming essays. He descends Powell, crosses Market and descends in Sixth street on a branch of the original Pine Street Coffee House, no less, I believe he would be capable of going to the original itself, if he could only find it. In the branch he seats himself at a table covered with waxcloth, and a pampered menial of High Dutch extraction and indeed, as yet only par tially extracted, lays before him a cup of coffee a roll and a pat of butter, all, to quote the Daity very good. Awhile ago R. L. S. used to find the supply of butter insufficient; but he has now learned the art to exactitude, and butter and roll expire at the same moment. For this refection he pays ten cents, or five pence sterling." Stevenson goes on to relate that "half an hour later inhabitants of Bush street observe the same slender gentleman, armed, like George Washington with his little hatchet, splitting kindling wood and breaking coal for his fire. He does this quasi-publicly upon the window sill; but this is not to be attributed to any love of notoriety though he is, indeed, vain of his prowess with the hatchet (which he persists in calling an axe) and daily surprised at the perpetuation of his fingers. The reason is this: that the sill is a strong supporting beam, and that blows of the same emphasis in other parts of his room among the Pacific islands had resulted in sc might knock the entire shanty into hell. Thenceforth, for from three to four hours, he is engaged darkly with an ink bottle. Yet he is not blacking his boots, for the only pair that he possesses are innocent of lustre, and wear the natural hue of the material turned up with caked and venerable slush. The youngest child of his landlady remarks several times a day, as this strange occupant enters or quits the house, 'Dere's de author!' Can it be that

this bright-haired innocent has found the true

clue to the mystery? The being in question

is at least poor enough to belong to that I onor

Stevenson recounts that his next appearance

in the course of the day is "at the restaurant

of one Donadieu in Bush street, between

Dupont and Kearney, where a copious meal,

coffee and brandy may be procured for the sum of four bits, alias 50 cents. The wine is put down in a whole bottleful, and it is strange and painful to observe the greed with which the gentleman in question seeks to secure the last drop of his allotted half, and the scrupulousness with which he seeks to avoid taking the first drop of the other. This is partly explained by the fact that, if he were to go over the mark, bang! would go a tenpence. He is again armed with a book but his best friends will learn with pain that he seems at this hour to have deserted the more serious studies of the morning. When las observed, he was studying with apparent zest the exploits of one Rocambole, by the late Vicomte Ponson du Terrail. This work, originally of prodigious dimensions he had cut into thicknesses, apparently for convenience of carrying. Then the being walks-where is not certain. But, by about half past four, a light beams from the windows of 608 Bush, and he may be observed sometimes engaged in correspondence, sometimes once again plunged in the mysterious rites of the forenoon. About six he returns to the Branch Original, where he once more imbrues himself to the worth of flyepence in coffee and rolls. The evening is devoted to writing and reading, and, by 11 or half-past darkness closes over this welrd and truculent existence." Stevenson points out that, "as for coin, you see I don't spend much; only you and Henley both seem to think my work rather bosh nowadays, and I do want to make as much as I was making-that is, £200 a year; if I can do that, I can swim; last year with my ill-health, I touched only 2109; that would not do. I could not fight it through on that; but, on £200, as I say, I am good for the world, and can even, in this quiet way, save a little, and that I must do. The worst is my health. It is suspected I had an ague chill yester day: I shall know by to-morrow, and you know if I am to be taid down with ague, the game is pretty well lost. But I don't know; I managed to write a good deal down in Monterey when I was pretty sickly most of the time, and, by God' I'll try, ague and all. . . . Iam afraid I bore you sadly with this perpetual talk about my affairs. I will try and stow it; but you see it touches me nearly. I am the miser in earnest now. Last night, when I felt so ill. the supposed ague chill, it seemed strange not to be able to afford a drink. I would have walked half a mile, tired as I felt, for a brandy and soda." Sixteen days later Stevenson tellanother friend. Charles Baxter: "I have had to drop from a fifty-cent to a twenty-five cent dinner; to-day begins my fall. That brings down my outlay in food and drink to forty five cents per diem. How are the mighty fallen! Luckily, this is such a cheap place for food: I used to pay as much as that for my first breakfast in the Saville, in the grand old palmy days of yore. I regret nothing, and do not even

dislike these straits, though the flesh will rebel on occasions." In March, 1880, Stevenson was prostrated with a dangerous illness. On April 16 he writes to Edmund Gosse: "You have not answered my last, and I know you will repen when you hear how near I have been to another world. For about six weeks, I have been in utter doubt; it was a toss-up for life or death all that time, but I won the toss, sir, and hades went off once more discomfitted. This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that I have a friendly game with that gentleman I know he will end by cleaning me out; but the rogue is insidious, and the habit of that sort of gambling seems to be a part of my nature: it was. I suspect too much indulged in youth It is, when once formed, a habit more fatal than opium I speak, as St. Paul says, like a fool. I have been very, very sick; on the verge of a galloping consumption, cold sweats. prostrating attacks of cough, sinking fits in which I lost the power of speech, fever and all the ugliest circumstances of the disease and I have cause to bless God and my wife that is to be, and one Dr. Bamford (a name and his little wife; we hire a wagon and make the Muse repels; that I have come out of all

this and got my feet once more upon a little hilltop, with a fair prospect of life and some new desire of living. Yet I did not wish to dle neither; only I felt unable to go on further with that rough horseplay of human life; a man must be pretty well to take the business in good part. Yet I felt all the time that was doing nothing to entitle me to an honorable discharge; that I had taken up many obligations and begun many friendships which I had no right to put away from me, and that for me to die was to play the cur and slinking sybarite, and to desert the colors on the eve of the decisive fight."

In the spring of 1880, Stevenson's unfortu nate situation was made known to his family in Edinburgh, and he was informed by tele graph that he might henceforth count on £250 annually. He alludes to this change in his position in a letter to Sidney Colvin in April You may imagine what a blessed business this was. And so now recover the sheets o the 'Emigrant,' and post them registered t me. God only knows how much courage and suffering is buried in that manuscript. The second part was written in a circle of hell unknown to Dante, that of the penniless and dying author. For dying I was, although now saved. Another week, the doctor said, and I should have been past salvation. I think I shall always think of it as my best work. There is one page in Part II. about having got to shore, and sick, which must have ost me altogether six hours of work as miser able as ever I went through."

In the spring of 1888 Stevenson returned to California, and on June 28 of that year he started from the harbor of San Francisco or what was intended to be only a health and pleasure excursion of a few months' duration, but which turned into a voluntary exile prolonged until the hour of his death. His company consisted of his wife, his mother, his stepson, Mr. Lloyd Osbourne, and his servant, Valentine Roch. They sailed on board the schooner yacht Casco and made straight for the Marquesas dropping anchor on July 28 in Anaho ay, the harbor of the island of Mukahiva The magic effect of this first island land fall or his mind Stevenson has described in the opening chapter of his book. "The South Seas." After spending six weeks in this group Stevenson and his companions sailed southeastward. visiting several of the coral atolls of the Paumotus, or Low Archipelago. Thence they arrived in the first week of October at the Tahitian, or Society Islands. In these their longest stay was not at the chief town. Pancete where Stevenson fell ill. but in a more secluded and very beautiful station. Tautira, whither he went to recruit and where he was detained by the necessity of remasting the schooner. Here Stevenson and one of the local chiefs became special friends and parted with mutua regret. Sailing thence northward through forty degrees of latitude Stevenson and his companions arrived about Christmas, 1888, at Honolulu, where they paid off the yacht and made a stay of nearly six months. Here Stevenson finished "The Master of Ballantrae" and "The Wrong Box;" and hence his mother returned for a while to Scotland, to rejoin her son's household when it was fairly installed, two years later, at Vailima. From Honolulu Stevenson made several excursions, including one which profoundly impressed him, to the leper settlement at Mo lokai, the scene of Pather Damien's ministrations and distressful death. This first year of voyaging and residence

encouraging a renewal of health, and had added so keen a zest to life by the restored capacity for outdoor activity and adventure that Stevenson determined to prolong his experiences in yet more remote archipelagos of the same ocean. He started, accordingly, from Honoluly in June, 1889, on a trading schooner, the Equator, bound to the Gilberts, one of the least visited and most primitively mannered of all the island groups of the Western Pacific, and emerged toward Christmas of the same year nto semi-civilization again at Samoa, where he wrote his first Polynesian story, "The Bottle Imp." He staved in the Samoan Islands for six weeks, enchanted with the scenery and the people; bought a property, the future Vailima, on the mountain side above Apia, with the notion of making it, if not a home, at least a sions among the islands, and began to make collections for his studies in recent Samoan history. In February, 1890, he went on to Sydney to find his correspondence and to consider future plans. It was during this stay at Sydney that his righteous indignation was aroused by the publication of a letter against Father Damien by the Rev. Dr. Hyde of Honolulu. Here. also, he fell once more seriously ill with a renewal of all the old symptoms, and the conclusion was forced upon him that he must make his home for the rest of his life in the tropics though, with occasional excursions, as he ther hoped, at least half way homeward, to places where it might be possible for friends from Eng. land to meet him. In order to shake off the effects of this attack he started with his party on a fresh sea voyage from Sydney, this time on a trading steamer, the Janet Nicoll. which took him, by a very devious course, among very remote islands during the months of April-August, 1890. During the voyage he began to put into shape the notes for a volume on the South Seas which he had been compiling ver since he left San Francisco. Unfortunately he spoiled his work by trying to make it too impersonal, and too full of information, or what he called "serious interest." On the return voyage of the Janet Nicoll he left her at New 'aledonia, staying for some days at Noumea before he went on to Sydney, where he spent four or five weeks of the later August and Sepember, 1890. Thence he returned in October to take up his abode for good on his Samoan property, where the work of clearing and plant-

ing had been going on during his absence.

Man as an Animal and as a Member of So-We are indebted to Dr. PAUL TOPINARD for valuable discussion of the main problems of the philosophy of science in a book entitled Science and Faith (Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company). The title is, to some extent, misleading, for the author has much to say about science, and very little about faith. He holds, indeed, that the two words mutually exclude each other. Science is knowledge; faith s belief. Science considers things objectively and accepts only what is demonstrated by observations, generalizations and inductions stopping at agnosticism. That is, stopping where the facts abandon us, and where, consequently, we decline to have recourse to a nebulous hypothesis. Faith, on the contrary, is subjective, individual and dependent cerebral sensibilities, as the latter has been constituted by heredity, education, habits and the temperament of the subject. In Dr. Topinard's opinion rhetoricians who seek to demonstrate the compatibility of the truths established by science with the beliefs dictated by faith only shatter the latter. A faith which is examined and shown to be in accord with facts ceases to be faith. It is, at the same time, admitted that, in the epoch of mankind's history in which we live at present, there may be utility n extolling certain articles of faith, as Kant has done. It is even conceded that certain philosophical doctrines ought to be advocated. Topinard would not deny that the four or ive principles, especially the principle of justice, which society takes for its base and its ideal, should be converted into articles of faith, but he would have it perfectly understood that the two domains of science and faith are totally different, are, in other words, two contrary poles. It is science, therefore, and not faith, which

we are invited to consider in the volume before us. The book is essentially a contribution to sociology; but it possesses the merit of being nade by an original inquirer of high rank in a department of science which constitutes the groundwork of sociology; consequently, its conclusions have sprung from a direct and creative contact with the facts, and not from derivative and secondary theories about the facts. Whatever objections, therefore, some of its special tenets may evoke, its importance

as a first-hand investigation should not be underrated. We should add that, while written by a specialist, the discussion is not exclusively anthropological and ethnological The physical, historical, cultural and psychological factors of social evolution receive the same thorough consideration as do the theological and sociological factors. The author's central view is thus briefly indicated. To begin with, anthropology, which is assumed not to concern itself with societies, discovers in man an animal only; in his primitive stage, man is perforce subjective, and by a rigorous natural logic, egocentric; the law of self-preservation, as determining his conduct both toward nature and his fellow animals, is paramount with him. Sociologically considered, therefore man's animality, man's primitive and inherited egocentrism, is the primal source of all the difficulties that arise in society, the arch-enemy to be combatted. This contradiction, apparent or real, between the individual and society, between the social evolution as i actually is, and the social evolution as we should like it to be, constitutes the problem to be elucidated. How has man been changed from an egocentric to a sociocentric animal? By what ideas? By what forms of reasoned conduct? By what organized impulses? By what forms of evolution natural and artificial? And finally, what norm does the past furnish us for guidance in the future?

This book should be read consecutively by those who would appreciate the argument We can only exemplify the breadth and variety of the author's knowledge, the cogency of his reasoning and the lucidity of his exposition. To that end, we would dwell especially on a chapter in which he considers the evolution of altruism. In an earlier part of his book, Dr. Topinard has directed attention to the signs of altruism in animals. He has shown that the first associations, not induced by sexual instincts, which occur between individuals, or groups of individuals, were the result of indifferent circumstances. First came the habit, then the pleasure, and, finally, an instinctive impulse to seek the company again. This impulse is observable in animals of the same species, or even of such different species as have no reason to fear each other, particularly among birds and herbivora. Colisions sometimes take place, but the pleasure of living together outweighs the drawbacks, and mutual concessions are made; the reciprocal need of altruism and of solidarity gains the upper hand. In short, the social instinct is both noteworthy and thoroughly consolidated in a large number of animals Man, who has sprung from social animals has inherited this instinct or consolidated need. In a state of nature where the difficulties of life are merely of a refractory character, but where there is room for all, and where one has to struggle only with beasts and with nature, man's need of companionship, as in the case of Robinson Crusoe before the advent of his man Friday, is the more imperious according as he has a highly developed faculty of exchanging ideas. (a faculty which the animals lack), and according as these ideas are multiplied. In this stage, moreover, man has not yet learned to suppress himself. He is entirely spontaneous; he has not yet had experience of the necessity of looking beyond his acts. At first, his family suffices almost entirely to satisfy his need of company and its associated needs. He is a good father, a good husband and easy in manner, if certain savage and

reflex habits be excepted. Later, when life is still not difficult and when he lives in little bands, his conduct still remains natural. He yields to his first impulses, he does not analyze them, he has comrades whose company he enjoys in hunting and chatting, neighbors whom he treats as he wishes to be treated; he renders services without asking for anything in exchange; he spontaneously nakes sacrifices for others, as they do for him. In all things he behaves with frankness, and does not know what it is to lie. He is still truly the child of nature. If he is struck, he reacts; he is offended, he avenges himself. Without some reason, however, and without akes a girl a mother, he marries her. If members of his family or his friends are attacked he springs to their defence and identifies their sause with his own. Later, when the family ecomes a clan, and the number of men likely to be found together has still more increased change sets in. The altruistic need, or the desire for company, finds a wider scope, it is displaced and extended far beyond the limits of the family. The individual prefers the pleasures shared with his companions to the joys of his own hearthstone; between him and them. the intercourse of friendship is established; a bond unconsciously unites them; if one is attacked by the members of another community all of his clansmen rise in his defence.

In these different stages in the evolution of

altruism, acts having nearly the same motives

are nearly the same in all circumstances. the response to the same solicitation cannot vary much. All the members of a group or clan accustom themselves to regarding their empirical conduct as the best that can be followed. These acts, being repeated, become customs of which all individual opinions, that is to say public opinion, approves. To conform to that opinion is to act in the best manner. Not to conform to it is to oppose it, and, consesequently, to deprive oneself of the collective approbation to which one is sensible. The eldersthe councils of tribes - make these customs which are consecrated by opinion, the basis of their judgments when they are called upon to settle differences. Tradition becomes the rule, and this receives the sanction of punishments. To obey the rule is good, to disobey it is bad. But, if the elders assume the right to judge and punish, and if wrongdoers submit to their decisions, the reason is that the former take it for granted that the individual arraigned before them is responsible for his acts, while the latter are confident that they will be treated on a footing of equality before the tribunal. In the state of nature, man is restricted in his acts only by his individual will, with or without thought as to their consequences. If he thinks he can kill an animal without being killed or wounded himself, he does so. If he thinks he is running too great a risk, he abstains from the game. Toward his fellow being he is not less free to act as he pleases, but more motives go to influence his conduct. One person is congenial to him; another is useful to him, renders him services, amuses him, loves him; another is indifferent to him, but who knows whether, on the morrow, their roles will not be changed. and whether that other will then not be of use to him? Will the other not then behave as he bimself has behaved to-day? Then again. what will his family, what will tribal opinion say? People will censure him, will avoid him. The savage thus knows what he can and ought to do, and what restrictions he should impose upon his first impulses. The word rights, even f we assume that he has any vague notion of anything of the kind, he would be incapable of understanding. He acts according to the circumstances; his conduct is restricted as regards the game he pursues; it is more so when he is in contact with one of his fellow beings, it is still more so when he is in contact with several; and more so again when there are very many, as in societies. It is the same with his obligations. By the very fact that the savage knows how to modify his conduct according to the circumstances, and will consider that such and such acts must not be done. or that he must respect the personality of others. so that they, in turn, will respect his, it is evident that the obligations which he assumes are made by way of exchange. The whole matter is one of reciprocity. There is no understanding or contract. Duty is but a word which we apply wrongly to the savage and the ani-

the latter. In short, among men more or less near the state of nature, acts are produced spontaneously, as they are among animals; they are the best in the conditions given; they are not | incessant struggle for the satisfaction of needs due to reasoning. The instinct to adapt acts which are multiplied by his intelligence. At to necessity is the whole thing; the ideas of the start the struggle was against individuals

mai: the former comprehends it no more than

good and of evil, of responsibility, justice, solidarity, rights and duties, liberty, have as yet no effect upon conduct; the ideas do not The savage, abandoned to himself and untaught, acts empirically; yet his conduct is as correct as ours, if not more so. His ethical notions conform to what his daily relations with his fellows demand; his acts are ruder, eruder and more reflexive; that is all. Our author thinks it would be curious to knowas yet we do not positively to what degree savage's internal sensibility enters into his acts, to what degree man yields to the blind impulse which leads him to long for the society of his fellows, what degree of pleasure he experiences in the sympathy he has for others, or that others have for him: whether he possesses in a developed degree the faculty of representing to himself the pleasure and pain of others, of feeling and sharing them; in a word, to what extent he is altruistic, whether in the first, or passive, degree, which is benevolence or in the second, or active, degree, which is charity.

In an earlier chapter of this book will be found generally exhibit in the state of nature. Dr Copinard holds that, when we carefully read the long accounts of travellers and of missionaries who have lived in intimacy with them, and have gained their confidence, we can recognize no room for doubt. Savages are affectionate and devoted. It may be objected that their manners are brutal and that with them public opinion consecrates acts which we condemn severely. But are we ourselves, asks Dr. Topinard, so perfect, and are our manners, though refined, much superior? Witness what occurred recently in Armenia, and what the courts reveal in highly civilized countries from day to day. It is true that, among certain savages, public opinion approves of the man who has the courage to strangle a friend in agony in order to spare him useless suffering Among others, sons abandon without food or bury alive, their old and infirm fathers, who are incapable of following the nomadic band. Yet, among these same savages, the same old men are listened to and respected, the sons know that their turn, too, will come, and the shed tears when, in the last extremity, they acquiesce in their parents' death. Moreover facts of this character are rare, and are recount ed by travellers because of their extraordinary nature. Assuredly, savages do not un derstand morals as we do, but they have their morality nevertheless, and one which, though different from ours, has yet its value. They are straightforward, frank, loyal and not wicked In altruism, they are at the same stage as man; birds and herbivorous mammals, and certainly at a degree higher than are the generality of civilized races. The impulse which originally moved man to pass from the state of nature or purely family state, to the social state, was not interest, but the need of being happy in

the company of others, the need of exchang

The word "originally" is emphasized by Dr

ing ideas and sentiments.

l'opinard for the reason that, as soon as the contact between men increased, as soon as the conditions of existence became complex and difficult, the character of the scene changed and darkened. The struggle for existence, at first feeble, gradually increased in intensity spread and grew general among societies classes and individuals. To live in new conditions every day more difficult becomes, ultimately, the fate of every member of a com munity. Individualism consequently aug ments and altruism diminishes. Men are constantly on their guard and weigh their acts Experience renders them egoistic. To suc ceed, to rise, to dominate, to become rich are the ruling passions. The more intelligent a man is the weaker, as a rule, is his compassion and the more deaf is he to the cries of victims Here and there a few altruists come to the surface, but they are the dunes. Such was civilization as Hobbes saw it when he propounded the aphorism. Homo homini lupusman is toward his fellow man'a wolf. The author of this book, for his part, would not ascribe this egoistic state of things entirely to civilization. Nature herself is in part, if no entirely, responsible for it. She has made being provoked to it, he never commits an men signally unequal; some crippled sick injury, but often does good. If he is a youth and incapable of the least intellectual efsome envious, hateful, wicked and truculent others gentle, loving and devoted; some pre destined from birth to premature death or to a long life of suffering; others predestined to suc cess and happiness. Animals have muscles.claws and teeth, and use them when they are hungry Man has but one weapon, but it is more poignant, venomous and deadly, to wit, his intelligence and he uses it, even when he is not hungry, to satisfy other needs, multiplied a hundredfold by that intelligence. Animals of the same species rarely fight; men rend and devour each other. Very early, long before Darwin, far back in the dim past, these facts challenged the attention of thoughtful men. In the councils even of tribes not much advanced, when punishments were defined for deeds considered punishments were defined for deeds considered evil, an effort was made to forestall, soften and correct them in the interest of the general weal. But, as the particular interest of a sect or a monarch gained the upper hand, these efforts decreased, the cause of the feeble, the unfortunate and the enslaved had none but secret defenders among men of the elite, who were more sensitive to suffering than were those about them. At times, these defenders were unknown legislators, as in Egypt, where we find a few humanitarian laws inspired by lofty ideas of equality; at times, they were members of the sacerdotal class who sought to offer consolation to the victims of nature and civilization, and to give them the hope of posthumous compensation, as in India, where the preachers of Buddhism said: Lite is but a chain of exils; resign yourselves, conduct yourselves well; your recompense is Nirvana.

It is pointed out by D. Topinard that Greek philosophy occupied itself but little with the miseries of the classes that were really miserable. Its glance was directed higher; it imagined an ideal of happiness for the sages, an organization useful for the State, and abided by these propositions. The words "justice," "good" and "edi" are anoughtered because is personal reconstitutions. evil, an effort was made to forestall, soften and

an organization useful for the State, and abided by these propositions. The words "instice," "good" and "evil" are encountered incessantly in their discussions, but they are used in a different sense from that which we give to them nowadays; while, with reference to the order of nature, the excellencies thereof are recognized but not the faults. Aristotle distinguished justice of exchange from jus-tice of distribution, but without insisting on the unwritten laws which Socrates had said were inscribed in the human heart. The Stoics and the Epicureans achieved nothing but the consecration of egoism. Only a few legisand the Epicureans achieved nothing but the consecration of egoism. Only a few legislators of antiquity, like Solon and Numa, seem to have been inspired to some extent with the moral idea, as contrasted with the utilitarian idea which was everywhere predominant. It was really not until the rise of Christianity that we saw the establishment and spread of generous and altruistic ideas having in view not a single and privileged class of citizens, but the pariahs of society who are so much in need of support. These ideas recognize no distinction of class or nationality, but have in view mankind at large. Such were the ideas of love in its universal sense, of fraternity, equality, compassion, charity and disinterestedness: the distinction of moral good and evil, of private and public conduct; the notion of one's duty toward oneself and toward others. ness; the distinction of moral good and evil, of private and public conduct; the notion of one's duty toward oneself and toward others. Nevertheless, the progress was only superficial. Although legislators strove to inspire themselves with the new principles their acts did not correspond to them. The masses of the population suffered as much as in other times. The struggle was just as implacable, altruism was as thinly sown as ever. After the Renaissance, however, altruistic ideas gained headway. The latent principles which governed the organization of human society were discussed. The notions, previously vague, of rights, of individual liberty, whether unrestricted or curtailed by the social state. vague, of rights, of individual liberty, whether unrestricted or curtailed by the social state, gradually assumed shape and solidity. The sentiments of reciprocal duty, solidarity and resnonsibility were extended; the double declaration of the natural rights of man, that namely, issued in 1776 by the United States and that put forth in 1790 by France, opened up a new era, the era of natural rights; that is to say, of rights which society cannot abrogate, and which involve the correlative duty of respect for the same rights in others.

We are thus brought to the present time at which, more than ever before, the following questions dominate the whole field of practical sociology. On the one hand, scientific facts show that Nature, in placing man at the acme of creation, and in having given him his intellect as his weapon of existence, has, at the same time, condemmed him, as other animals are condemned, to an

of other species, as it still is among animals At present the struggle is carried on in the som of the human species, between man and man, cogenitally unequal and not responsible for that inequality. The struggle engenders suffering, misery and ruin, and divides mankind into oppressors and oppressed. into conquerors and conquered. On the other hand, all that is good in the human heart, love. compassion, generosity and regard for the dignity of man considered as the highest animal species, is aroused and protests energetically against this state of things. It demands that fraternity shall not be an empty word written on the front of public edifices, that justice and peace shall reign, that each individual shall be recompensed for his efforts and have his legitimate share in the general happiness that, in a word, solidarity shall be made a reality. On the one side is arrayed egoism the principal factor in discord; on the other side, altruism, the principal factor of concord. On the one side is the human individual, always more or less an animal, knowing only his present life and desiring it to be the best possible. On the other is human society, an impersonal and permanent entity set forth at length the qualities which savages | in which are resumed the experience of the past, the hopes of the future and the happiness of the present, distributed equitably for the best among all.

Is the reconciliation of these opposed factors possible? That is the question examined in the ninth chapter of this book. Can we, in other words, bridge or explain away the apparent or real contradiction between nature on the one hand, as exemplified in the individual man, and human society on the other between the social evolution such as it actually is, and the social evolution such as we would like it to be? How has the unfortunate contradiction been brought about? Why empiricism, the servant of circumstances, led to such a regrettable result? It is, answers Copinard, because nature does not hold the same views as we do, or rather because it holds none whatever; because it proceeds blindly with its fatal laws and takes no heed of our opinions or of our desires. It is because the best for nature is not the best for man in society; it is be cause man, in order to attain what he desires ought, if he could, to have changed himself and transformed his animal nature. At the outset society conformed to the individual, but the conformation did not last long. The reaction of individuals one upon another grew stronger. Some struck and cut about them at pleasure; the necessary relations between man and man, if they are to form a society, became falsified: everything was embroiled. Society became a thing apart, an assemblage of conditions quite different from what they had been at the start, an environment sui generis Moreover, the evil was too deep-seated for an adaptation of it to be effected easily. Man has preserved his animal nature, which remains in conflict with his surroundings. Society and the individual have become antagonistic; what the one demands does not suit the purposes of the other. Social life is a composite of sacrifices often imposed without com pensation and greatly exaggerated; the individual, on the other hand, desires to be free and fully responsible for his acts. Man is an integral part of nature and is subject to its imperative laws; human society is an edifice constructed upon the sand of conventional materials. The consideration of this contradiction leads Topinard to speak of some of the principles on which human society reposes. These principles are reduced provisionally

to four: liberty, and its counterpart, solidarity equality, and its corollary, justice. Let us consider these principles in turn with a view to their relation to the association of human beings in communities. Our author reminds us that liberty is a purely human conception involving volition. Liberty does not exist in nature, where there is never spontaneity, but only effects determined by one or several causes acting in different directions and counteracted by others acting in contrary directions. The strongest cause, or the resultan of the interaction, carries the day. In plants and animals, all phenomens are the consequence of organization actuated by exterior or interor agents. So-called acts of will are the results of excitations which bring into play ancestral and personal habits and the moods of the moment, as we term them. The same is rue of thought, save that here the excitatio is sometimes internal, and so bears the appearance of spontaneity. Psychical freedom is relative, and depends on the ego. This being understood, it is evident that the individual in the state of nature enjoys all the freedom which his organization allows. He is restricted in his acts only by material obstacles, his muscular and nervous strength, and his own judgment of his motives for acting in given cases In the presence of one of his fellow beings. he behaves as in the presence of an animal whom he desires to conciliate or to combat In proportion as his relations with his fellow beings grow more extensive he learns to restrain himself, but only under pressure of force, or for some analogous reason. In society, he is subject to necessity, which places upon his primitive instincts of liberty restrictions which he cannot escape. To describe, first, the province within which an individual is permitted to move about with perfect liberty, and, secondly, the other province wherein such movement is forbidden; to describe, in other words, ment is forbidden; to describe, in other words, that which is his and that which is others, two words have been invented in modern society: to wit, rights and duties. Neither the one nor the other conception exists in the state of nature. There, man does what he wants to and what he can. He has duties toward himself only, and they are of the physiological order. The inalienable rights propounded by the French Revolution are rights that are deemed indispensable to the existence of man, and of which he cannot be deprived. They anthe French Revolution are rights that are deemed indispensable to the existence of man, and of which he cannot be deprived. They answer to what Thiers has called "necessary liberties." It is, at the same time, admitted that, in case of war or the suspension of social laws, even these fundamental rights may be temporarily suppressed. Duties are the correlatives of rights; they are all founded on the obligation to respect in others what we would have them respect in us. They are embodied in the laws, and may be summed up in the phrase "obedience to the laws." They are absolute, and their infraction entails punishment. By the side of these fundamental duties embodied in laws, there are other duties having no such paramount sanction, but prescribed by custom, public opinion, self-respect and veneration for family and ancestors. It is needless in social practice to speak of rights; the individual is only too much disposed to broaden their conception. On the other hand, there is a constant necessity of speaking of duties, which form the very essence of life in common.

What, now, is meant by solidarity? Topinard would define it as a physical, functional or psychioal bond between parts, which is extended the propagated from one grain to another: if, however, we separate a grain its solidarity ceases. In organized beings soli-

is are assemblages of molecules, solidarized belocks are propagated and some serious and other. If, however, we separate and the solidarity ceases. In organized being, solidarity ceases. In the first stage cohesion pure and simple is the cause. In the hister stages of organized life the solidarity becomes functional. Each part of the animate entity is specialized, is entrusted with some given function. Which it performs to the profit of all the other parts of the colony, just as, in its turn, it profits from the functions which they perform. In the final stage, when solidarity is complete, all the functional in the midst of the profit of all the other parts of the colony, just as, in its turn, it profits from the functions which they perform. In the final stage, when solidarity is complete, all the functional in the midst of the profit of all the other parts of the colony, just as, in its turn, it profits from the functions which they perform. In the final stage, when solidarity is meaningless. There is her neither than the profit of an interest profit of an extensive of the individual. In the midst of function, Absolute independence is the characteristic of the individual. Nevertheless, a relative or psychical solidarity resulting from the functional in the midst of the solidarity is meaningless. There is her neither than the colony is the first stage. If the exchange is repeated it grows habitual and becomes premeditated the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the solidarity is not completed to the profit of the profit of the profit of the profi

the administration of the latter, all bear the consequences of it, whether these be good or bad. Similarly, if a change be made in the laws, all the members of a community either suffer or profit by it. It is this sort of solidarity that engenders the idea of community, which is none other than that of common interests. Solidarity and mutuality are synonymous. Social solidarity has been sponsaneously and progressively produced as a consequence of life in common. It differs totally from the physical and physiological solidarity of the animal colony; it has no other sanction than the interest of the individual on the one hand and the law with its corrive measures on the other. the administration of the latter, all hear the

IV.

Let us look next at equality, the third of the principles on which modern society is founded. The author of this book reminds us that equality exists in nature, but only fortuitously. Is nature, the effect is always equal to the power expended, or to the sum of the powers, diminished by the sum of the resistances. Excepting the case where they counterbalan o each ther, the power and the resistance are sounequal and so varied that the effects are generally unequal. Two bodies have rarely the same dimensions, the same form, the same properties exactly. Two individuals have rarely the same value; the one will always get the upper hand of the other. Among species, as among the individuals of a single species, inequality is the rule, and is, moreover, the condition sine qua non of evolution. In the most perfectly organized society, equality is merely conterminous with the laws which are common all. Outside of those laws, it is simply word, a principle growing from another principle, to wit, solidarity. But solidarity being purely psychical, and restricted according to circumstances, and equality never being complete, even in perfect solidarities, such as those of absolutely unified animal colonies, equality can make no pretension to being absolute. The foundation of the principle is as follows: Men united in society make equal sacrifices or. to speak more exactly, sacrifices which are regarded as equal, and they assume an equal share of the general responsibility. Therefore, they must be equally treated, and must enjoy equal advantages. From theory toreality, however, is a far cry. Equality is magnanimous dream, the cliff on which all

endeavors are shattered. We come now to the principle of justice. There are few words whose signification has varied so much from antiquity to the present day, or which reflects so accurately the customs of any given time. In its present and highest stage, it is a purely human conception which, in its most widely accepted meaning is equivalent simply to possessing or receiving what is one's due. Is there anything in nature corresponding to our idea of justice? A body role through space, enters our atmosphere, becomes incandescent by the friction and bursts into fragments. A storm arises, the oak is torn out by its roots, the reed bends and straightens again. A wolf pursues a stag which flees the one runs to eat, the other not to be eaten; both exert their powers to the utmost; the victorious wolf is recompensed for his perseverance, the stag succumbs through his insufficient powers of respiration. The Tasmanians lived happily: the whites invaded their island, massacred them and appropriated their territory. At bottom, all these cases are one. Everywhere, that takes place which must take place, conformably to the conditions and the forces in action. Nature witnesses, impassively and indifferently, the phenomena of which she is the theatre. The incandescent body, the oak, the stag, the Tasmanian; none has greater weight than the other in her balance. To living bodies, as to inert bodies, nothing is due in nature; there is no such thing as justice. Let us now look at the individual being, and place ourselves at his point of view. He possesses his particular organization, of which he is not the author, and which it is beyond his power to relinquish. As Herbert Spencer has said, "He is subjected to the effects of his own nature and of the conduct which it involves. It is due to him, therefore, that his acts should have the consequences which they logically imply: that he should reap what he has sown. Jpon this condition only is he responsible.

f his ego has been deceived, if he has wrongly

judged what it is best to do, if he has suffered

habit to produce the act, and has not inter-

vened to modify it, if he was distracted or indo-

lent at the critical moment, if he has reasoned alsely, he suffers the consequences. But if he has been correct in his forecast and judgment. the benefits and the profits belong to him This is the conformity of ends to acts; organic or physiological justice. In the case of the wolf just mentioned, it was justice that its perseverance should be crowned with success perseverance should be crowned with success, whereas, in the case of the stag, it was unjust that, having put forth its utmost powers to escape the danger, it should be, after all, devoured. A mother carries her infant during the period of gestation, brings it forth in pain, nurses it and lavishes her care upon it; it is unjust that she is not recompensed and that the child dies. The following, however, is a complicated case: Two men struggle with such weapons as each one has at his disposal. The one has greater courage, the other greater skill. Each has a claim upon recompense, but one of them conquers. Where is the Justice? From the viewpoint of nature, there is none, for each has obeyed his organization. The stronger has conquered the weaker. From the particular viewpoint of each, however, justice has been done for him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having put forth his utmost powers has succeeded and injustice has been done to him who, having achieved the same end, was, nevertheless, vanquished. Individual justice, therefore, is relative. Yst, even in this restricted form, it has wide import and applicability, for it engenders personal responsibility, and so becomes the moving cause per excellence of all human activity, involving the reward or punishment of acts, and impelling the ego to be ever alert for intervening, for adapting his acts, to the circumstances and for looking to his interests. If there were no such fusions to his interests. If there were no such fusions acts to the circumstances and for look whereas, in the case of the stag, it was unjust frequently assert themselves without in vention on the part of the ego, but, in not vention on the part of the ego, but, in not interfering, it has done wrong, and should safer the consequences. Acts constitute the only material which lends itself to judgment lightentions and the motives from which they spring cannot be analyzed; they form an inextricable labyrinth. The ego and its acts, whatever they be, are solidary and compact.

We have now come to human society. Solidarity, as we have seen, involves duties on the part of the individual, while reciprocally society has duties which it owes to individuals. Each in its turn is bound to recipited due. Hence social justice, i.e., the regulations which control and sanction the plastions between the two transacting parties.

lations which control and sanction the tions between the two transacting pa Social justice is a necessity at once there all and practical for the perfect function of social relations, just as individual justices the perfect functioning of the tions between acts and their effects. It ders the individual responsible to ciety, and society responsible to the individual trepresents the sanction of the two responsibles. We have seen that theoretical individuals stand upon an equal for society, that is to say, have the same I